THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL



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THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

BY

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PREFACE.

THE argument stated in the following tractate is the result of an investigation which I was led to make by the perusal of a report, sent to me by some unknown friend, of a Conference of the Advocates of Conditional Immortality. I seized the opportunity to do what had long been on my mind, and make myself acquainted with the principal works which have been published on this question. I have always felt that the arguments on the subject of Eternal Punishment urged with great earnestness and ability by my old friend, Rev. S. Minton, whose aberration from the truth of the Gospel, as I consider it to be, can be regarded by none with a more profound regret than myself, have about them a certain air of plausibility highly calculated to mislead those whose habits and opportunities unfit them for the close examination of such a

subject. The additional works of this school, with which I have subsequently made myself acquainted, have the same characteristic. I can readily understand that those who have been accustomed to accept the doctrines of Eternal Punishment and of the Immortality of the human Soul as matters of course, authenticated by the general belief of the Church of Christ, should be at first staggered by these works, for I must confess to having shared for a moment in this feeling of perplexity. But the sense of it vanished directly I began to recapitulate in my own mind the positive declarations of the Word of God, and to array them in their argumentative order: I then stepped at once from the controversial mist into the clear light of the faith of the Church Catholic in all ages.

It is this order of investigation which I commend to the attention of others. Let the positive side be taken first, and let this be derived from the personal, prayerful, and patient study of the Word of God. Let nothing be taken for granted, but let each link of the reasoning be tested one by one; the mind will then be armed

to consider, and patiently to examine, the arguments recently urged against the traditional interpretation of the crucial words 'life' and 'death,' and their concomitants, as they occur in the Word of God. When a different process is followed, and a mind devoid of any clear, positive convictions of its own, is launched upon the sea of controversy, it is no wonder that it should be bewildered. We may feel perfectly assured that an argument we are reading is wrong, without being able at the moment to detect where the fallacy lies. A broad investigation of truth may easily run into the niceties of disputation. Some minds are endowed with a keener subtlety and refinement of thought than others; and in the perusal of a book, as in other things, the weaker intellect will naturally go to the wall. The infirmities of human thought at best correspond with the inevitable ambiguities of human language. To all these causes must be added the fact, of which I entertain a profound conviction, that the great defect of modern education consists in the absence of any training of the reasoning faculties, and of an acquaintance

with the laws of evidence. Hence truth can only be safely sought, not in the exact balancing of argument against argument, but in a personal, independent search of those inspired oracles of God which constitute the rule of faith to the Protestant Churches.

In recommending this method of inquiry I am anxious not to be misunderstood. I do not for a moment advise that we should adopt a creed of our own, and then refuse to consider what can be said against it. By all means let the works issued by the modern school on the two kindred subjects of Eternal Punishment and Conditional Immortality be carefully read in the first place, that we may catch a clear conception of the nature and difficulties of the question to be solved. When this is done, let us go back to our Bibles, and prayerfully ascertain for ourselves what is the will of God. Then, lastly, let us take up the modern works once more, and patiently examine them step by step, trying our own conclusions by their arguments and their arguments by our conclusions, and bringing them both anew to the standard of the

Word of God. It rather argues confidence in the truth of God, than any distrust of it, to be willing to examine, over and over again, the grounds of our belief, and to test their validity by every conceivable process which other minds may furnish to us.

The Scriptural argument contained in the following pages is the result of convictions, framed in the course of such an inquiry as I venture to recommend to others. As originally written it was much longer and fuller than it is at present. The limited amount of space which alone the Editor of the *Christian Observer* was able to allow me, necessitated very rigid curtailment and condensation, and the pages thus omitted were thrown into the waste-paper basket. Now that a wish has been expressed for the separate publication of the article, my present distracted condition amid the bustle of removal to a new sphere of ministerial labour renders me unable to avail myself of the opportunity afforded me of supplying again the matter which was omitted. I must, therefore, content myself with issuing the tractate as it is, and hope at some

future time to strengthen whatever my critics may show to be the weak points in it, and supply the links which may prove to be defective, whenever the release of my books from their packing-cases some months hence, and the relaxation of the pressure incident to new duties and engagements, may enable me to do so. Meanwhile I ask for what I have ventured to adduce, the same frank and unprejudiced consideration which it is my own prayerful desire to give to all opinions and arguments which affect the doctrines of the faith.

EDWARD GARBETT.

CHRIST CHURCH VICARAGE, SURBITON,
Dec. 12, 1877.

THE

Immortality of the Soul.

THE controversy relative to conditional immortality represents a further stage of the discussion relative to the eternity of punishment. The zealous opponents of endless punishment have transferred the weight of their attack from the future prospects of the wicked to the immortality of the soul, under the belief that it is the key to the position and the logical turning-point of the whole question. They plead that the belief in this doctrine has laid men under the necessity of interpreting the language of Scripture in an unnatural sense; because they have come to it with a pre-

judgment, arising from what they have supposed to be an indisputable article of the faith. It is probable that they are not altogether wrong in the fact, however I may differ from them in their estimate of it. But it is as open for one party to use this appeal *ad invidiam* as for the other, and it may be as true with one as with the other. It may be replied with perfect fairness that the necessity of denying the natural immortality of the soul in order to be able to deny the eternity of future punishment places the advocates of conditional immortality under the necessity of fixing an unnatural meaning on the language of Scripture, and I must frankly admit that the influence of such a necessity appears to me very evident. But in truth such arguments are not really worth anything on either side, and had better be discarded altogether. The real question is,

whence has the belief in the immortality of the soul been derived, and on what grounds is it now called into question? The belief may powerfully have influenced the interpretation of a certain class of expressions in the Word of God, and yet it may itself have been derived from the Scriptures. In this case its influence is perfectly legitimate; for it brings Scripture to interpret Scripture, and is thus based on the proportion of faith.

It is true, that the advocates of the new school give a different account of the matter. They say that the belief in the natural immortality of the soul is partly to be referred to a Jewish, and partly to a Pagan origin. The plea is a very rash one, and singularly open to retort. The Pagan traces of such a doctrine are but few and slight, and totally inadequate to explain its universal currency in the Christian Church.

If, however, its origin be Jewish, whence did the Jews get it, but from their Scriptures? But they misunderstood and corrupted these Scriptures, is the reply, in this as well as in other acknowledged particulars. If so, then why was it that the Lord Jesus Christ never corrected their mistakes, as He did correct their mistakes in other particulars? One of the strongest arguments in support of the scriptural authority of the doctrine of eternal punishment is derived from the admitted belief of the Jews in our Lord's day, and the sense of endless duration which it is undeniable that they attached to the word 'eternal,' and to its equivalents. For if they were wrong, is it conceivable that our Lord would employ in speaking to them this very self-same word in the very self-same relation, and yet never warn them that He did not use it in the sense they were accus-

tomed to attach to it? An argument of this kind has been used in the other direction from the classic usage of certain words. But it is stronger beyond all imaginable comparison, when it is applied to the Jewish usage. If the Jews were accustomed to understand the word 'eternal' in one sense, in the sense, namely, of endless duration, and our Lord used it, speaking to these very Jews, in another sense, it is difficult to know by what word, consistent with common reverence to the character of our Lord, such a mode of speaking can be characterised.

It will be my object to bring the Catholic doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and the modern doctrine of conditional immortality, to the test of Scripture. I propose to put aside the powerful philosophical arguments which have hitherto been mainly used in this controversy, and to appeal to

the positive teaching of the Word of God alone. It is necessary for this purpose, that the question at issue should be stated as clearly as possible, and carefully disembarrassed of secondary and unessential issues. It has arisen thus. There are two passages in the New Testament which press with peculiar weight on those who reject eternal punishment. The one is Matt. xxv. 46, 'These shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal.' The adjective of duration is the same in both clauses. It is argued that the word should be eternal, and not everlasting. But if the distinction between them was worth anything, it would be neutralised by the broad consideration, that whatever the adjective means in regard to death, it must mean equally in regard to life. The promise and the threatening are so inextricably blended together, that we

cannot rub off the severe sharpness of the one, without also undermining the very foundations of the other. This is evidently felt. It is admitted by the author of *Life in Christ*, the most important publication of the new school, that 'the punishment, of whatever nature, is as eternal as the life.' The second passage is Mark, ix. 44, 46, 'The fire that never shall be quenched, where their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched.' Yes, it is replied, the worm and the fire will last for ever; but it does not follow that what is consumed by them will last for ever also. I reply that it does follow, from the very point and object of the appeal; for the argument is that any sacrifice, however great and painful, is after all little in comparison with the infiniteness of the suffering incurred by not making it.

The appeal is to the individual, and therefore the comparative estimate must be

applied to the individual also. But if the language has reference only to the eternal duration of the fire that consumes, and not to the eternal suffering of the person who is consumed, there is no individual application whatever. The words are simply objectless, meaningless, senseless. This is confirmed by the emphatic use of the relative 'their worm' (*αὐτῶν*), the worm of them: of whom, but of those who do not cut off the offending right hand, or pluck out the offending right eye—the individual persons to whom the appeal is made? The relative inextricably identifies the duration of the worm with the identity of the individuals who will suffer from it. The instruments of the punishment are admitted to endure for ever; and it is also admitted that no period of deliverance will ever come to the criminals submitted to it. The punishment of the individual will therefore

continue as long as the individual continues. From this conclusion there is no escaping. How long then will the individual continue, according to the revelation of the Word of God? Here the doctrine of immortality is thrown into the front. If the soul will last for ever, the punishment must necessarily last for ever likewise. It is impossible to get rid of the doctrine of eternal punishment, unless by denying the immortality of the soul. It must be replied, punishment will not continue for ever, because the soul itself will not continue for ever: the soul is not immortal. But since the blessedness of the saved will confessedly be everlasting, or at all events since none have hitherto dared to deny it, it is necessary to draw a further distinction, and to hold that endless existence is a gift bestowed by Christ upon His people. The saints will live for ever by virtue of a special donation of life; but

the wicked, having only a mortal constitution, will be utterly consumed and annihilated in the devouring fire of hell.

This is the genesis of the doctrine of conditional immortality: it is avowedly an effort to get rid of the severe side of the divine justice. The process is plain; the links few and simple; the controversial necessity indisputable. I am content to say that the suspicion of a human and controversial origin attaches itself not more naturally to the doctrine of immortality than to that of conditional immortality. The first is the admitted doctrine of the Church Catholic from the first ages downwards; the other the doctrine of a school comparatively small and comparatively modern. In judging between them, certain considerations which have been made very prominent in the controversy must be wholly put on one side.

1. The question must not be prejudiced by extravagancies of thought which may have been superadded to the Catholic faith, but which form no part of the one simple question now to be decided. Nor must the mind be put off its balance by the feeling of indignation at any fanatical excesses of language of which men may have been guilty. That many false, foolish, and monstrous things have been said on the subject of future judgment in the heat of a preacher's rhetoric, or as the outcome of an unbridled and licentious imagination, is most readily admitted. This is true of men in all churches; but especially of the Church of Rome, where the sensational horrors of hell have not only been depicted from the pulpit with a fervour actually ferocious, and a fulness of detail as frightful as it has often been untrue, but have been presented visibly to the eye by the

skill of the painter and the sculptor. Many of these things have been shocking to all sense of reverence; much more to all sense of pity and of human tenderness. We fully admit all this, and more. But there is no opinion on earth which is not pushed to excess by some of its votaries, and injured by the extravagancies of its friends. If all the members of a school of thought are to be lumped together, and judged promiscuously and without discrimination, there are none who would suffer more from it than the advocates of conditional immortality.

2. We must not be affected by any speculative estimate of the influence which this doctrine or that may be supposed to have on the acceptance or the rejection of Christianity. There can be no doubt that, if all the distinctive doctrines of the Gospel were emasculated of their dogmatic sharp-

ness, and smoothed down into an amiable humanitarianism, the Gospel would be infinitely more popular in the general estimate of mankind; but what would it be worth when it was accepted? Nothing. Estimates may very widely differ as to the particular doctrines which most irritate the opposition of the human heart. Some would mention one, and some another, according to the class of objectors with which he had happened to come into contact. Dr. Abbott, in his new book, *Through Nature to Christ*, specifies the resurrection as a doctrine peculiarly offensive. Many we doubt not, would object to the doctrine of eternal punishment; but a much larger number would object to the doctrine of the Atonement, and the holiness and justice of God involved in it. It is this which is the great crux of Christianity, and its most offensive stumbling-block in the eyes of

the world. Are we prepared to give it up in order to make religion more acceptable to the bulk of mankind? Why not conciliate them by rejecting all these doctrines, if the fact of being acceptable or unacceptable to mankind be once admitted as the test of truth or falsehood? Such arguments are infinitely precarious, and only serve to bewilder. To use them amounts to the rationalistic plea that the human consciousness is the test and standard of Divine truth, and that we are capable of measuring God by the moral ideas of man.

3. Equally must we discard in this matter all appeals to sentiment, and especially to the mere sentiment of horror. All the laws of the Divine government are maintained on a scale perfectly appalling in its magnitude to the weakness of the human mind. But the mere increase in the scale of its application makes no difference in

the essential righteousness or unrighteousness of a law. I adduce, for instance, the amount of evil actually existing in the world, an appalling aggregate alike of crime and of suffering, which the human mind is happily unable to comprehend; for, could it grasp the frightful whole, it would fail under the very horror and dreadfulness of it. Yet it is an indisputable fact to every Christian, that a God of infinite benevolence and love consciously tolerates and permits it; and it is a matter of our firm faith that His wisdom will ultimately overrule it to His own greater glory and the higher happiness of His creatures. The difficulties presented by the eternity of punishment may be perhaps somewhat larger in their scale, but they are not in the slightest degree different in kind to those which are presented by the origin and permitted existence of evil in a world,

which God at its first creation saw to be very good.

It is easy to sweep together into one broad generalisation the twelve hundred millions of human beings that people our globe, and to carry the enumeration backwards throughout the generations that have lived and died since the beginning: and then, with the imagination impressed with their countless multitude, to ask with triumphant complacency, whether we can believe that the God of love made all these to perish for ever, and has miserably consigned from all eternity countless myriads of them to everlasting damnation. The *ad captandum* argument may mislead persons not accustomed to think. But to a trained intellect it can have no weight whatever. It is false in theology, false in sentiment, false in fact. It is false in theology, because the eternal loss of souls is

not the result of God's will, but arises wholly from rebellion against it. It is false in sentiment, because we have no right to brood in imagination over the sensational details of truths which have been revealed to us only in their outlines. It is false in fact, because the adherents of the Catholic faith do not believe that all the heathen are hopelessly lost, but that they will be wisely and graciously judged 'according to what a man hath, not according to that he hath not.' (2 Cor. viii. 12.)

Lastly, we must not allow our judgments to be warped by the plea that this particular interpretation or that will be injurious to the character of God, and will be inconsistent with His benevolence and love. The proper order is to interpret the Word first, lexically, grammatically, and contextually, and to frame our doctrine afterwards. We may be quite sure that God will take

care of His own character, and that no legitimate interpretation of His word can possibly derogate from His perfections.

When this plea is urged against the eternity of punishment, that the doctrine is inconsistent with the loving character of God, the answer branches out into two directions. On one side, it may be replied that to an amiable sentimentality the doctrine held by the advocates of conditional immortality is fully as shocking, and as replete with horror, as the doctrine of eternal punishment itself. To my belief it is worse, and far more difficult to reconcile with the love of God. First, there is the annihilation of the soul, with all the blank horror of non-existence, the absolute opposite of our instinctive love of life, and to some minds more dreadful than any amount of physical and sensible suffering. Then it is to be further remembered, that some

amount of physical torture in hell is held by the advocates of conditional immortality; the author of *Life in Christ* maintains it most strongly. The language of the word of God is too precise, too emphatic, too reiterated to admit of its being denied. For an undefined time, they say not how long, the souls of the wicked will be tortured in hell-fire and then annihilated; but why the torture, if annihilation is to follow? Why should they be kept alive for the mere purpose of suffering, and not be annihilated at once? Moreover, on the hypothesis of this school, the wicked absolutely cease to be at death; but at the resurrection they are to be recreated, 'reconstituted,' in order that they may first be tormented, and then annihilated. On the hypothesis of the Catholic faith the soul is essentially immortal, and the endless agonies of the wicked are the result of

human sin,—its perversion and distortion of the grand and stupendous gift of an immortal existence. On the new hypothesis God actually recreates in order to torture, and then to annihilate. I venture to affirm that this last hypothesis is far more shocking, and therefore far more difficult to reconcile with the love and goodness of God, than the traditional belief in the immortality of the soul, and in eternal punishment as the necessary result of it to the wicked.

In point of fact, it is impossible to get rid of the stern side either of human experience, or of the Divine government. It has its origin however, not in God, but in the opposite of God ; in sin which is contradiction to His will, and in Satan who is His foe. The punishment of sin is awful, because sin itself is awful.

But there is another answer altogether,

and it is furnished by the experimental testimony of the Christian Church. Eternal punishment is declared to be irreconcilable with the goodness of God, and therefore it is concluded that men who believe in it cannot feel love for God. The natural conclusion would be, that the love of God has never existed in the Church till the new school arose in it. We turn back to the saints of old, with whose souls we still commune in their books, and we see the conclusion to be ridiculous. It is admitted that for ages and ages the Church has unhesitatingly believed in the eternal punishment of the wicked: has believed, that is, in a doctrine asserted to be irreconcilable with the love of God; yet, somehow or other, men have loved God nevertheless. How rich is the history of the past in the record of saints, confessors, and martyrs! How does its extant literature burn and

glow with love, and overflow with tenderness and adoration! The same character of an all-captivating, all-absorbing love for God appears everywhere, from the rhapsodies of Ephrem Syrus and the glow of Augustine to the rapturous tenderness of Rutherford and Leighton. One of two things is plain; either the saints of old, who believed in eternal punishment and yet loved God nevertheless, were much more fond than wise: or else the advocates of the new school have formed a narrow, partial, and one-sided conception of the Gospel, and of the character of God as revealed in it. I believe the latter to be true. For myself I had much rather believe and love with the saints from the beginning, than love and not believe with the disciples of conditional immortality. To declare a doctrine inconsistent with the love of God, which has existed side by side

with that love, and has fed it and been fed by it for nineteen centuries, is either the falsest of fallacies or the greatest of delusions.

The one question, therefore, with which we have to deal is the teaching of the word of God.

There are certain truths implied in Scripture rather than asserted ; they underlie the entire system of thought, and are so engrained into the very structure, the warp and woof of the language, that they are really present everywhere, and cannot be got rid of without disintegrating the whole. I believe this to be the case in the present instance, and that conditional immortality cannot be maintained without doing extreme violence to the language of Scripture, and landing us in inextricable difficulties.

It must be remembered that the immor-

tality of the soul does not stand alone in this respect; there are many other doctrines in the same position. I may mention, for instance, a doctrine so fundamental as the Deity of the Holy Ghost. The Bible may be searched from end to end without finding one categorical assertion of it, and yet it is proved by a large variety of consistent testimonies nevertheless. So it is with the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son; so it is with the observance of the first day of the week as the Lord's Day; so it is also with the doctrine of infant-baptism, which we yet believe to be 'most agreeable with the institution of Christ;' so it is with the finality of grace at death. A little search would furnish other instances. In the marriage laws, for instance, leaving wholly out of sight the disputed question of marriage with a deceased wife's sister, there are some incests of a very gross kind,

of which no express prohibition will be found in Scripture, although the cases higher up and lower down in the scale of blood relationship are carefully specified. Our duty, therefore, is to ascertain the meaning of Scripture, not to find fault with the precise mode in which it may have pleased God to express that meaning. An inference, if it be close, immediate, necessary, may be as absolutely conclusive as a positive statement,—perhaps more so. That which is involved in the language used may lend itself less easily to subtle analysis and equivocation, than the meaning that lies more upon the surface. For instance, mutual recognition in the final world is gathered with the utmost confidence from the language of St. Paul in 1 Thess. iv., when it is seen that without it the very point and object of the Apostle's argument falls to the ground. The proof of the

immortality of the soul would be indefinitely less strong if the doctrine depended on half-a-dozen positive texts, than it is now that it is incorporated with all the histories and arguments of the Word throughout. The reason is this: in the one case it would depend on the meaning assigned to a few leading words; in the other it is blended up inseparably with the sense.

But in gathering the meaning of Scripture from its words, we must take care to interpret them by the *usus loquendi* of Scripture. The usage of classical authors may be of considerable value: but it is the secondary, not the primary question—this is the usage of the Word of God. I will not waste my own words or the reader's time in attempting to prove that every literature, every art and science, we may say every language, has its own *usus loquendi*.

The word may be radically the same, and the primary idea embodied in it may be the same, yet its specific application may vary from what is known to logicians as its first intention, to a second, third, fourth, and so on. Almost every modern German writer of any note has his own use of terms, and to insist on understanding these terms in the sense they bear in ordinary conversation would only lead to inextricable confusion. An instance very parallel to the use of classical words in New Testament Greek, is furnished by the translation of the Scriptures into the living languages of the world. In some cases great difficulty has been found in settling upon a proper native term even for the idea of God. The conception having been absent, the word was absent. All that could be done was to select the best word, and to fix it into a second intention. It would be

mere wantonness to insist on interpreting the word as it was originally used, and not as it was subsequently appropriated. The words of Scripture must be interpreted by the *usus loquendi* of Scripture.

Never has this plain rule been more glaringly violated than in the controversy relative to the immortality of the soul. We take for instance the verb ἀπόλλυμι. It is assumed that the word invariably means to reduce into nothing: to annihilate, not the materials, but the thing compounded out of the materials. Yet in twenty-two out of the eighty-seven times in which the word occurs in the New Testament, it is simply impossible that it should bear such a meaning. The limits of my space forbid the discussion of this in detail. But in the New Testament we refer to such passages as Matt. viii. 25; x. 6, 39; Luke, xv. 4, 9; xix. 10; and

in the Old Testament to such parallel passages as Isa. xiv. 20, 23; Jer. xxxvi. 29; Ezek. xxv. 7. It will probably be replied that in these latter passages the force of the word 'destroy' must be modified to suit the nature of the object to which it is applied. Just so. The primary force of a word must be suited to the subject affected by it; in other words, it must be interpreted according to its context.

What then is the positive teaching of the Scriptures relative to the nature and destiny of man? They teach that man is a compound being, made up of body and soul. He is not a mixture of two elements, but a compound of two distinct and separate parts, each of which is organized in itself, and complete in itself, and neither of which loses any one of its proper attributes or acquires any fresh attribute from their combination in one

and the same personality. There is a combination of body and soul, but not an admixture of them into something else which is neither one nor the other. The difference will be found to be great, and in the present question essential. Water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, but it is neither oxygen nor hydrogen, but a *tertium quid*—'a new substance, with new and distinct phenomena of its own, which we call water.' So long as the combination is maintained, the water exists; but let the two elements be severed by analysis, and the water ceases to exist, resolved again into oxygen and hydrogen. While the union lasts, we cannot say this part is oxygen and this is hydrogen, for the two elements have for the time lost their identity and individuality in the *tertium quid* made up of them both. The union is in this case

chemical, not mechanical. The whole is specifically different from either of its simple elements. Now, if man was a compound of the same kind, he would perish in the same way when the elements composing him were separated, and the elements on separation would be specifically different to what they are in combination.

But this is not the case. The soul and body are united in the one man. Each is an entity; each complete; each organized; each living. It is not only that the whole lives, but that each part lives with a life of its own. There is a life in the body which is not the life of the soul; and there is a life of the soul which is not the life of the body. This is asserted in a large number of texts, of the exact meaning of which I shall have something to say presently, in which men who are alive in the body

are yet said to be dead. 'You hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins.' The body was not dead, but the soul was; whatever that death may be thought exactly to mean. It is evident, therefore, that life and all its forms cannot be lumped together, as if human life were simply the result of the union of body and soul; but each part lives, so that the body may be alive while the soul is dead; and conversely the soul may live while the body is dead. The compound creature man is the combination of two complete things, and the union of them is precisely analogous to the hypostatical union of the human and divine natures in the one person of Jesus Christ. The Lord was not, is not, a *tertium quid*—a something which is neither human nor divine—but He is both human and divine, both completely, both without the attributes of either being lost

or being confounded together. The Athanasian Creed strongly asserts this analogy, 'As the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.' Death is the separation of the two ; but, as will be seen shortly, not the annihilation of either one of them.

This distinction of body and soul is clearly asserted in Scripture, and the assertion supplies our first firm step in this controversy, for many Conditionalists altogether deny that there is such a thing as a soul or spirit separate from the physical organization. Thus our Lord distinguishes the two: 'Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.' (Matt. x. 28.) On these words I observe three things. First, the word translated 'soul' cannot possibly be translated by 'life' (as it is translated in many places

of our version), because there is no contrast between the body and life, for the body itself lives with a life of its own, or else it could not be killed. Secondly, that the body may be killed, may die, when the soul continues to live, or else it would be impossible to kill the body without also killing the soul at the same time. Thirdly, that the destruction of the soul cannot be a mere act, for if so, why mention the sphere of destruction,—'destroy in hell?' If destruction be annihilation, it is an act complete, as would be the extinguishing of a flame. Whereas it is here associated with hell, and it is admitted, even by those who deny that the wicked will eternally suffer, that in hell the worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched. In the parallel passage in St. Luke, the distinction between the death of the body and the death of the soul is yet more strongly expressed, 'Be not afraid

of them that kill the body, and *after that have no more that they can do.*' (Luke, xii. 4.)

Limitations of space render further quotation in detail impossible. But we refer our readers to Matt. xvi. 26; Acts, ii. 27; 1 Thess. v. 23; the Third Epistle of John, ver. 1; and as corroborative evidence to Heb. x. 16; 1 Peter, i. 9, 10. In these latter passages salvation is spoken of as a thing already accomplished in believers, so that persons might be alive, and yet not be saved. If the salvation of the soul only meant that life would be continued after death by the special gift of Christ, when without it the whole man 'would go to nothing,' such a salvation could not be a thing already accomplished, and synchronous with the earthly bodily life.

If we turn to the Old Testament Scriptures, we find the same distinct reference

to the body and to the soul of man everywhere. Thus, 'It came to pass that as her soul was departing (for she died), that she called his name Ben-oni. . . . And Rachel died, and was buried in the way to Ephrath.' (Gen. xxxv. 18.) If the departure of the soul were simply the cessation of existence altogether, and not the passage of the immortal spirit into another state, why is used the explanatory phrase, 'for she died?' and what contrast can be sharper than is suggested between the soul that departed and the body that was buried? With this remark fresh in the memory, we ask the reader to examine the following passages: Deut. xi. 18; xiii. 3; 1 Kings, xvii. 21, 22; Ps. xix. 7; Eccl. xii. 7; Isa. iii. 9; Jer. iv. 10; Ezek. xviii. 20. Let it be remembered that there can be neither virtue nor vice in the mere flesh, for it is but the instrument of the spirit which dwells within it, as within

a temporary tabernacle. (2 Cor. v. 1.) Just as the eye does not see, but is only the mechanical instrument through which the living spirit sees; as the ear does not hear, but is only the mechanical organ of hearing, so the body does not sin, but is only the instrument of sin. The ascetic discipline of the Church of Rome is built on the forgetfulness of this, for the Scholastics who founded it interpreted the word 'flesh' in its bare first meaning. It is that which is capable of sin which is also to be punished by death, and this is so integral a part of man that it is identified with his personality. The same truth is consequently involved in all exhortations to holiness, and in the entire mass of Scripture which teaches the doctrine of spiritual regeneration and of the work of the Holy Ghost. But this lies out of the track of my immediate argument. Thus man consists

of a body and of a soul, and each one of the two is distinct from the other, possessed of a distinct life, endowed with distinct attributes, and capable of distinct feelings either of enjoyment or of suffering.

This, however, is the only first step. We must now notice that the name of the personality, the Self, the Ego, is applied indifferently to the whole compound being, to the soul, and to the body. If man were simply a *tertium quid*, made up of two elements, and losing his distinctive individuality, 'going into nothing,' as water does when the component elements are separated, for it ceases to be water and becomes oxygen and hydrogen, this mode of speaking could not be adopted. Here, again, we are guided by the usage of Scripture in regard to the two natures of our Lord. He was perfect man and perfect God,—perfect, that is, in the sense of

complete, with every attribute of manhood and of Godhead existing in Him in their distinct and unconfused fulness. So absolute is the hypostatical union of the two that Scripture speaks of the one person indifferently, sometimes when the body and soul of Christ are both referred to, sometimes when the reference is to the body only, and sometimes when it is to the soul or spirit only. Thus of His youth it is recorded that He 'increased in wisdom,' that could only be in the soul; and 'in stature,' that could only be in the body: yet the undivided personality is predicated of both. Thus it is used of the body only, 'Jesus therefore, being wearied with his journey, sat thus on the well' (John, iv. 6), where the context shows that the weariness was in the flesh alone. Thus it is used of the soul or spirit, 'He went and preached to the spirits in prison' (1 Pet. iii. 19), at a

time when He had been put to death in the flesh, and His body was actually lying in the tomb.* The action could therefore be the action of the spirit alone, yet it is asserted to have been the action of the person. The principle on which this usage is based is familiar to all theologians, and is known as the '*communicatio idiomatum*.' The strongest instance of it is found in Acts, xx. 28, where St. Paul speaks of the

* A not unfriendly critic has objected in the *Record*, that the 'assertion that Christ preached to the lost souls of the Antediluvians is at least questionable, if not untenable.' I am only concerned with the personal action of our Lord, and may dismiss all other questions. This is asserted in the plain grammatical force of the words, and confirmed by the vast preponderance of opinion in ancient and modern times. Bloomfield, in his *Digest*, says, 'This is supported by the united authority of the ancients and the soundest of our modern commentators.' Dean Pearson, in his great work, asserts of the fathers, 'There is nothing they agree on more than this—a real descent of the soul of Christ into

blood of God, 'Feed the church of God which he hath purchased with his own blood.' Now if the Scripture speaks in exactly the same way of man himself and of his two parts, we are bound to believe the human constitution to be analogous to that of our Lord, which consists of two whole and perfect natures in one indivisible person.

That this is the case admits, I think, of

the habitation of the souls departed.' Wolfius, after giving an immense list of authorities, and expressing his own concurrence in this view, shrewdly calls attention to the fact that the participle πορευθείς in verse 19, is also used in verse 22 of this same chapter, and indisputably in the sense of local motion; '*quod ut proprie accipi debere nemo negavarit.*' It is true that Alford explains the parallel expression in Eph. ii. 17, ἐλθὼν εὐηγγελίστο of the action of the Spirit. But as I do not rest on the authority of Alford, but on the grammatical meaning of the words and the general consent of ancient and modern opinion, I am not concerned to justify his inconsistency.

no dispute, for the one personality is predicated of acts which affect both body and soul. 'Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, according to thy word' (Luke, ii. 29), for death we believe to be the separation of body and soul. So in Acts, ii. 21, and Rom. x. 13, 'Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved,' yet salvation is admitted to include both body and soul. 'We must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ' (2 Cor. v. 10); yet who denies that both soul and body will be judged? 'If God be for us, who can be against us?' So the Psalmist spoke, 'Thy hands have made me and fashioned me' (Ps. cxix. 73); but has not God made both parts of man? It is needless to multiply instances such as Ps. lxxxix. 47; cxxxviii. 8; Rom. viii. 31; ix. 20.

But the personality is likewise referred

to interests and actions which reach to the soul only, and not to the material and animal framework at all. Thus in Luke, xvi. we have the parable of Dives and Lazarus, in which both the persons described are presented as conscious of feeling, and thought, and even mutual speech after death. Lazarus was carried of angels into Abraham's bosom, and there 'was comforted' (ver. 25). Dives after death 'lifted up his eyes in hell (Hades, not Gehenna) being in torment.' Yet Dives had just been buried, or was about to be buried, and the body of the beggar, full of sores, was sensitive no longer, though we are not told what became of it, and are left to conjecture that, in contrast to the grand funeral of Dives, it was left to the dogs. But in both cases, what was enjoyed and suffered could have been enjoyed and suffered in the soul, and in the soul only,

and yet the same men, Dives and Lazarus, are spoken of.

I do not deny that some particulars of this parable are to be regarded rather as the machinery of the story, than as an actual part of its substantial truth. But the rule by which the one part may be distinguished from the other is plain and easy. Whatever is found in the parable alone, and finds no support elsewhere in the Word, belongs to the machinery; whatever is affirmed in other passages, is a part of abiding truth.

In this case the evidence that the individual personality survives between death and the resurrection, but survives in the life of the soul alone, is so ample that the only difficulty is to select the most appropriate passages. Thus our Lord assured the thief upon the cross, 'This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise' (Luke, xxiii.

43); and yet we are told that the soldiers broke the legs of the thief in order to expedite his death, and no one has suggested that his dead body has ever yet been raised again. Our Lord told Nicodemus that 'the man must be born again' (John, iii. 3); and the difficulty found by this master in Israel arose from his supposing that our Lord was speaking of bodily birth, when He was speaking only of spiritual. St. Paul repeats the same thing, 'If any man be in Christ Jesus he is a new creature' (2 Cor. v. 17); yet a man's body is not changed on his conversion. The same usage will be found in Ps. xix. 13, Rom. viii. 14, and a multitude of other places.

But it is equally certain that in other passages the personality is predicated of the body only. We have already given instances in regard to our Lord: it only remains to adduce some in regard to men

in general. St. Paul charges the Corinthian Church to deliver the incestuous person, 'such an one,' unto Satan; but then adds that Satan's power was to be over the body only, 'for the destruction of the flesh,' the very object being that the 'spirit might be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus.' (1 Cor. v. 5.) St. Luke records that Herod was 'eaten of worms;' yet the flesh alone could have been thus afflicted. (Acts, xii. 23.) Our Lord affirms that those that 'are in the graves shall come forth.' (John, v. 28.) Such is St. Paul's language throughout 1 Cor. xv. The usage of the Old Testament is precisely the same—'the people thirsted there for water' (Exod. xvii. 3); 'He humbled thee and suffered thee to hunger, and fed thee with manna.' (Deut. viii. 3.)

In point of fact this mode of speaking is inseparable from all human experience and

human thought. We use it in our familiar language, unconsciously, of what we are doing every day of our life. What is done, or enjoyed, or suffered in the body or the soul, is referred to the one personality. We cannot avoid speaking this way, if we would. The invariable usage is the strongest of all conceivable testimonies to that union of two distinct parts, the animal organization and the conscious soul in one and the same man, out of which it springs, and from which it is inseparable.

Thus it appears that man is not a mixture of two things, but a combination of two parts, body and soul, in one; each part having its own organization, its own attributes, its own life, distinct from the other. It follows, therefore, that death or the separation of the two does not involve the annihilation either of the individual personality or of either of the two parts of

which it is made up, not even the annihilation of the body. I do not affirm that the argument suffices thus far to prove strictly that the soul is immortal; but it does prove indisputably that the soul is a distinct substance from the body, that it has a life of its own which survives after the life of the body has ceased; and that therefore the separation we call death does not kill the soul, but that both in the righteous and the wicked it survives afterwards, and survives continuously. But here comes in the doctrine of the resurrection and the judgment, on which I can only say a few brief words, painfully inadequate to the importance of the subject.

Here, again, the doctrine relative to our Lord's person affords valuable guidance. We are positively assured that the same Jesus will come again in like manner as He was seen to go to heaven. What was that

same Jesus but one person, with two complete natures, the divine on the one side, and the human, comprising a body and a soul, on the other? The creed of the undivided Church embodies the teaching of the word of God in the statement, 'He ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty; from thence He shall come to judge:' He, the same who lived and died, and descended into hell and rose again. The life of the Lord Jesus Christ is therefore a continuous, unbroken, uninterrupted life, and a life of which there shall be no end; 'He shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever, and of His dominion there shall be no end.' (Luke, i. 33.)

But the life of the saint is an unbroken, continuous life likewise, stretching side by side with the life of our Lord. That death does not destroy it is certain, for to deny

its existence after death would be to deny our Lord's most solemn words. That it lives continuously during all the period till our Lord comes again, is also certain; for St. Paul assures us that those 'that sleep in Jesus the Lord will bring with Him;' and how bring with Him, unless they have been with Him since the time when 'absent from the flesh' they became 'present with the Lord?' Then will follow the resurrection and the eternity beyond: still there is no hint of any conceivable cessation, 'So shall we ever (πάντοτε) be with the Lord.' I do not stop to argue on the force of the word; for it is admitted that the life of the saints will be strictly and absolutely an everlasting life.

But what of the wicked? That the souls of the wicked equally with the souls of the righteous do not cease to be at death, but survive in conscious sensitive-

ness, is evident; for Dives lifted up his eyes in hell, and the dead thief was that day in paradise with Christ. That this survival extends over vast and indefinite periods is also evident, for the spirits in prison had already survived out of their bodies for more than two thousand years, when Christ preached to them.* From this period we seem to look easily across the intervening ages to the resurrection and the judgment. The identity of the persons raised and judged is logically essential to the very idea of a resurrection and a judgment; indeed, it is so undeniable that

* To the various opinions entertained on this disputed passage I have already referred in a note to page 40. It is only necessary to repeat that the sense I have given to the words is indisputably their plain grammatical meaning, and that the objections urged against it are simply *à priori* conjectures of what it is thought the Apostle meant and did not mean to say.

Conditionalists can only meet the difficulty by the awkward and blundering theory of the reconstitution of the dead. If our argument as to the continuousness of life in our Lord and in His saints up to the judgment be sound, it carries with it the continuousness of life in the wicked also; seeing that the existence of the soul after death, and that for 2000 years after death, is affirmed. Nor, if this disputed passage (1 Pet. iii. 20) is put on one side, are we devoid of other evidences to the same effect. Thus Moses and Elias are represented talking with our Lord on the Mount of Transfiguration; and they must, therefore, have been alive, the one 1400 and the other 800 years, after death. Our Lord, pointing yet further backwards, affirmed the continued existence after death of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; for 'God is not the God of the dead but of the living.'

And that this continuous survival is true of the wicked as well as the righteous is clearly taught by Daniel, when he affirms the state of the wicked up to the day of the resurrection to be the state of sleep, not of annihilation—'Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt.' But if there will have been no break in life from birth up to judgment, it amounts to an enormous presumption that there will be no break in continuity afterwards, seeing that the self-same words used to express the life of the righteous after judgment, admitted to be everlasting, are equally used to express the life of the wicked. That this may not amount to a positive proof of absolute eternity of being we may admit; just as we have, and can have, no absolute proof of an actual eternity and

an actual infinity at all. But the presumption is all in its favour: for meanwhile the argument adduced in disproof is shattered into pieces, and leaves the great Catholic doctrine of the immortality of the soul untouched in all its grandeur and blessedness.

Now the whole language of Scripture in regard to everything affecting man must be interpreted in accordance with that *usus loquendi* which has been proved to prevail in regard to the man himself. The rule must be applied therefore to the words 'life' and 'death,' which are the crucial words in the present controversy, and the pivots upon which the whole discussion must turn. Whenever life and death are predicated of man, it must first be determined whether the reference is to the whole man, or whether it is to his body, or whether it is to his soul; and then the words 'life' and 'death' must be interpreted according to the nature of

that of which they are predicated. This is no more than our common mode of speaking. Scripture applies the word 'life' to inanimate things; it speaks of 'living waters,' and it is no uncommon thing for ourselves to speak in the same way, for instance, in the phrase, 'the Dead Sea.' In neither case is the mere existence of the water in question: we do not say that the Salt Sea has ceased to exist, when we call it dead; but the words refer to the presence or to the absence of a certain quality which the water may have, or may not have. We speak of a dead stone, or of a dead flower, but in both cases there is a modification of the idea according to the nature of the object of which we speak, and in neither case do we mean the same thing which we express by death in a human being. This arises from the common laws of language, and it is in harmony

with the common laws of language that the word of God must be interpreted.

My contention is that death, when it is referred to the whole being, implies the separation of body and soul, as for instance, 'He died for all' (2 Cor. v. 15); 'It is appointed unto all men once to die' (Heb. ix. 27); 'These all died in faith' (Heb. xi. 13.) When it is applied to the body of a man, it means the same as when applied to the body of a beast, the cessation of the functions of life, consequent immobility, insensibility, unconsciousness; as in such passages as, 'Touching the resurrection of the dead' (Matt. xxii. 31); 'Full of dead men's bones' (Matt. xxiii. 27); 'There was a dead man carried out.' (Luke, vii. 12.) When it is applied to the soul it bears the analogous sense of immobility, insensibility, and unconsciousness; and the laws of thought are such that we cannot even say

this without implying the continued existence of that which is without motion, sensibility, and consciousness. We cannot affirm these states of what is not, and has gone to nothing. This is the sense in such passages as 'if we be dead with Christ' (Rom. vi. 8); 'You who were dead in trespasses and sins, hath he quickened' (Eph. ii. 1); 'Thou hast a name that thou livest, and art dead.' (Rev. iii. 1.) The interpretation which Conditionalists are compelled to put upon such expressions is forced and unnatural to the last degree, and proves the viciousness of the system of thought which compels it. They say that the word 'dead' means those who would have died hereafter, that is, have ceased to be, if Christ had not conferred immortality upon them. 'The unregenerate men are described as the *dead*, as the *dead in sins*, because they are *certain to die* (*sic*), because

they are under sentence of destruction as men of mere *soul*.' (*Life in Christ*, p. 306.)

We ask our readers to notice that in no case, not even in the case of the body, does death mean annihilation, or the going into nothing. It is indeed deliberately and persistently argued that the body in this sense perishes at death. But it is a palpable fallacy, and admits of ready disproof. It arises from confounding together the idea of death and the idea of corruption—the dissolution of the earthly elements by decay. Yet they are evidently different. A man dies; but what change has taken place in his body? The heart has ceased to beat and the blood has ceased to flow; but the heart is still there in the same state that it was in before death, and for a while the blood is still there, for we presume that in case of a violent death the bleeding does not stop at the moment the heart ceases

to beat. What limb, what member, what organ has disappeared? After a while indeed the earthly elements begin to decompose, and be dissolved; but even human skill can for a time arrest the process, though the body be dead beyond all possibility of a doubt. Death is one thing, and corruption and dissolution another. They are the result of death; but they are not death itself, that is most certain. For if they are the same, then the daughter of Jairus was not dead, and the miracle which filled her parents with astonishment was no more than men do every day, when they awake a sleeper. Then the widow of Nain's son was not dead; and the sacred narrative only plays upon our credulity when it records there was 'a dead man carried out.' Then Lazarus was not dead, although Jesus Himself told His disciples, 'Lazarus is dead;' and though the inspired evangelist

narrates that 'he that was dead came forth.' Far more momentous than all, if death and corruption are identical, then our Lord did not die, for though His soul went into hell, His flesh did not see corruption. What then becomes of the Atonement, and of the Gospel altogether? Why, it is all gone. These modern Samsons in their desperate efforts to pull down the doctrine of eternal punishment pull down the whole fabric of the faith with it, and not only involve themselves, but the entire fallen race of man, in the one tremendous ruin.

If death be annihilation, going into nothingness, the conclusion it involves is yet more wide and monstrous. There is considerable ambiguity in the teaching of the various sections of the Conditionalist school as to the actual effect of death upon mankind. It appears to be taught that the saints of Christ at all events do not die at

all. In regard to Adam himself, it is distinctly asserted that the sentence was 'postponed, not repealed.' If death be annihilation, then of course, in the natural order of things, Adam should have passed out of existence at the moment of his sin, and in his annihilation all the race of mankind would have been annihilated likewise. But 'from the moment of his sin, the action of redemption began at once to unfold itself.' Adam was allowed to live and the race of mankind to multiply, in order to allow a sphere in which the Divine mercy might act; 'during the postponement springs to light' the manifold wisdom of a grace which has resolved on bringing many sons to glory.' (*Life in Christ*, p. 127.) Be it observed, that the postponement has taken place in all Adam's race from the time of the fall to the present day; consequently it would appear to follow, that the sentence

of death has never yet been executed on a single individual. No saint certainly, and apparently no other man, has ever yet died from the beginning of the world.

Death itself thus becomes a dream, a name, a fear of the future; and not the dreadful reality of a sorrowful human experience. For it is clearly admitted by the same author that the souls not of the righteous alone, but of the wicked also, are kept alive after death. This strange conclusion is forced upon him by the language of 1 Pet. iii. 20, and the impossibility of putting any meaning on them, without the violent supposition to which I am now calling attention. 'Every human soul survives; every human soul that has not heard it on earth will have the "Gospel" explained and offered in Hades. They may not accept it then: multitudes will not, but then they will be without excuse, and will

be condemned to death eternal, as if they were "men in the flesh" who rejected the reconciliation.' But if death be annihilation, and yet every human soul survives, and consequently no human soul has ever yet been annihilated, then no human being has ever yet died. In such a case either the whole discussion is one monstrous logomachy, or we are landed in a whole series of contradictions from which there is no escape.

This brings me to the question, in what sense must the word death have been understood by our first parents? The Conditionalist says, that they must have understood it in the sense of the destruction of the being. I affirm on the opposite side, that they cannot possibly have so understood it. The Divine threatening was precise, 'In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.' Yet it is

admitted that in the sense of annihilation our first parents did not die either in the day of their sin, or at any subsequent time, and indeed, that none have ever died to the present moment. Must they not have interpreted the word 'die' by the event that fell within their own experience? In the sense of liability to death, and therefore liability to the pains and weaknesses of mortality, they must have been conscious of the change that passed over them from that very hour. As regards their souls likewise, they must have been strangely unlike the perfect man and woman whom the Divine narrative presents to us, if they were not conscious of the change which the knowledge of evil had brought to their inner being, when instead of delighting in their converse with their Maker they tried to hide themselves from Him amid the trees of the garden. The blindness of

understanding, as well as the meanness of feeling, and the alienation of affection implied in the inspired story, are very remarkable. But that they should have supposed death to be annihilation of body and soul was simply impossible to creatures who found themselves surviving the sin and the sentence. The author of *Life in Christ* says that the sentence was not executed; St. Paul appears to have been of a different opinion: 'As by one man sin came into the world, and death by sin.' Yet if death be annihilation, and every soul survives after death, no such thing as death has ever yet been known. Our first parents must have judged from their own experience. And if from themselves they turned to the witness of the living creatures around them, they could have seen there no sign of 'coming to nothing' at death. That death existed among the animal creation from the first is

clear from the coats of skins with which the Lord God clothed the guilty pair. They must have seen that the body survived for a time at all events after death, just as it was under the law, when the dead beast became the property of the man who replaced him. (Exod. xxi. 34.) Or if they looked to the crust of the earth they surely would see no signs of annihilation there, for the strata of the globe are largely composed of the remains of dead animals. Every fossil surviving from the far past is an abiding witness against the doctrine of annihilation at death.

But if death be not the cessation of existence, neither can life be mere existence, simple being, and no more. So far from being inconsistent in understanding eternal life to be, not mere existence, but an existence of everlasting joy and delight, we adopt the only key by which the

language of Scripture can be interpreted in harmony with itself. Life to the body is the presence of the soul within it: life to the soul is the presence of God with it. The truth of an everlasting blessedness in heaven is cordially acknowledged by Conditionalists; but they perilously weaken the proof of it when they deny the correlative truth of everlasting suffering in hell. The impression naturally existing upon the mind is that the doctrine of everlasting happiness in heaven pervades the Word of God everywhere, in passages so abundant as to be beyond enumeration. It is true; but it is only true on the supposition of the immortality of the soul, and that life means not bare existence, but existence in bliss. I have collated the texts on this subject, and the result is rather surprising. Take away all passages which turn on the word life, and upon the phrases of duration which

are applied equally to punishment and to reward, and which if they do not imply endless continuance in the one cannot imply it any more in the other; and there only remain three texts, on which the certain hope of an everlasting reward can be founded. Adopt the argument applied by Conditionalists to Mark, ix. 43, viz. that the eternal duration of a state does not involve the eternal duration of those who are placed in it, and there remain only two texts. These two texts are in one sense repetitions of each other; for the language of Rev. xxi. 4, is evidently borrowed from Isa. xxv. 8. The former text explains the meaning of the latter to be that '*there shall be no more death*,' and from these words we may certainly draw the inference that the saints will live for ever in heaven: but it is only an inference. On Conditionalist principles there is not one explicit passage in the

entire word of God, which directly and categorically asserts the everlasting happiness of the redeemed in heaven.

The foregoing argument makes no pretension to be in any way exhaustive. It is confined to the Scriptural aspect of the question, and to this alone; and of this there remains not only a vast mass of particulars necessary for the full elucidation of the question at issue, but various connected lines of evidence which have not even been touched. This paper presents simply the statement of one particular line of argument; but it is a line which crosses the whole width of the inquiry, and if its various links hold good, it is decisive of the question. The adoption of this particular mode of proof must not be supposed to arise from any depreciation of the philosophical argument in its various branches. The proof of the immortality of the soul

which has been frequently drawn from the incompleteness of the mental and spiritual life here on earth, and the instructive yearnings after a future, forms a part of the evidences of Christianity, and should not needlessly be given up. The further argument adduced by Canon Liddon in his Sermon in St. Paul's on this subject, drawn from the fact that no matter is annihilated, and that therefore, if the soul be annihilated, the higher and spiritual part of man occupies a position and has a destiny inferior to that of the material body, appears to the writer to be very powerful. But it has been necessary to put all these collateral proofs on one side. The Catholic doctrine has been arraigned on the ground that it is not Scriptural. To this allegation it was desirable that a distinct answer should be given, and the argument of this paper is one mode of giving it. Many

minds have no doubt been led to submit the question to a thorough examination. The more minute and rigid, the more exact and comprehensive that investigation is, the more certainly will it prove that the immortality of the soul is an integral part of revealed truth, and is so intimately interwoven with the entire structure of the Word of God, that it cannot be eliminated without a violence destructive of the unity and subversive of the authority of the Christian Scriptures.

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